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REDISCOVERING FRANCIS LIEBER: AN
AFTERWORD AND INTRODUCTION
Michael Hen*
I
In our media age, more and more people are famous just for
being famous, rather than for any particular achievement, notori
ous or otherwise. We spend a good deal of time transfixed by ce
lebrities" known for no obvious qualities other than fame itself.
Francis Lieber, once this country's most respected law professor,^
of whom it was written in 1873 that "his fame will be secure in the
lap of history,presents the opposite case: he is forgotten despite
great accomplishment. At best, one might say he is famous for be
ing forgotten. His name comes up, but almost every modem refer
ence to Lieber points out that few remember who he was.^
Lieber himself may well have feared being forgotten—he per
petually viewed himself as undervalued—but not because that was
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.
1 Paul D. Carrington, Meaning and Professionalism in American Law, 10 CONST.
COMM. 297, 304 (1993) ("Lieber was recognized by his contemporaries, including James
Kent and Joseph Story, as perhaps the premier legal academic of antebellum times.").
2 M. RUSSELL THAYER, THE LIFE, CHARACTER, AND WRITINGS OF FRANCIS UEBER

50 (1873), reprinted in 1 THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF FRANCIS LIEBER 13 (Daniel
C. Oilman ed., 1881).
Ton,»c
3 In addition to most of the contributions to the present symposium, see, e.g., James
Farr, The Americanization of Hermeneutics: Francis Lieber's Legal and Political Hermeneutics in LEGAL HERMENEUTICS 83,84,98 (Gregory Leh ed., 1992) (Lieber s work important
but "relatively unattended to," Lieber "virtually forgotten"); James Farr, Herrr^neutical
Political Science, in HISTORY OF SOCIOLOGY 65, 66 (1986-1987) (Lieber's works languish
unread on library shelves"); M.H. Hoeflich, Roman and Civil Law in American l^gal Edu
cation and Research Prior to 1930:
Preliminary Survey, 1984 U. III. L. FEV 719 722
("IFlew Columbia faculty today recall that the second appointment to the faculty of the
Columbia Law School in 1857 was Francis Lieber."). Reviewing the Eskndge and Fnckey
legislation casebook. Judge Richard Posner notes that the book is slim on philosophical
material, but does "include an illuminating passage by the neglected Gemian-Ameri<an
hermeneuticist, Francis Lieber." Richard A. Posner, Book Review, 74 VA. L. Itov. 1567,
1570 n.4 (1988) (reviewing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY O^OO))-

As if to confirm the neglect, Posner then misstates the title of Lieber's Legal and Political
Julia Ward Howe, who was a friend of Lieber's, confidently predicted that "the works
which preserve the essence of his laborious and eventful life must surely grow in interest if
the world does not greatly deteriorate in wisdom." Julia W. Howe, Dr. Francis Lieber,
CRITIC, Dec. 30,1882, at 351. I leave to the reader whether Lieber's fading away demon
strates that Howe was wrong about his work or right about the world.
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what he felt he deserved. "I know," he wrote, "that my work be
longs to the list which begins with Aristotle, and in which we find
the names of Thomas More, Hobbes, Hugo Grotius, Puffendorf.'"*
While most would deem this assessment a bit of an exaggeration,
Lieber deserves better than he has received. The present sympo
sium aims to correct the oversight, for there is a good deal more to
say about Lieber than that he has been forgotten.
In this issue the Cardozo Law Review republishes Lieber's
Legal and Political Hermeneutics,^ the work of his which offers the
best combination of readability, brevity, and interest to the modem
audience. The Review has also solicited nine commentaries that
elaborate on the issues Lieber's works raise, and compiled an ex
tensive bibliography of works by and about Lieber for those wish
ing to read further.
This Essay serves as an afterword to Lieber's text and an intro
duction to the articles that follow. Following a brief biographical
sketch of Lieber, I will highlight some important themes from
Lieber's work and the accompanying essays.
II
Franz Lieber (the Francis came later, in America) was bora in
1800 in Berlin.® His family was intensely nationalistic and
Francophobic (or, in the words of Lieber's friend Charles Sumner,
4 FRANK FREIDEL, FRANCIS LIEBER: NINETEENTH CENTURY LIBERAL 165 (photo, re
print 1968) (1947). Similarly, Lieber once offered the following list of the most prominent
political philosophers during the century preceding 1850: Montesquieu, de Tocqueville, and
himself. Id. at 275; see also BERNARD E. BROWN, AMERICAN CONSERVATIVES: THE
POLITICAL THOUGHT OF FRANCIS LIEBER AND JOHN W. BURGESS 16-18 (1951) (quoting
Lieber as asserting that he would "not rest until I force the political and legal world to
quote me").
5 FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS: PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRE
TATION AND CoNSTRUcrioN IN LAW AND POLITICS (William G. Hammond ed., 3d ed., St.
Louis, F.H. Thomas & Co. 1880) (1837), republished in 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 1883 (1995).

[In subsequent citations, the page number as it appears in the republication will be given in
brackets following the page citation to the third edition.]
6 Lieber's birthdate is in dispute. The date usually given is 1800. See, e.g., Paul D.
Carrington, The Theme of Early American Law Teaching: The Political Ethics of Francis
Lieber, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 339,358 (1992); 6 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 236
(Dumas Malone ed., 1936). Freidel, however, concludes that Lieber was bom in 1798.
FREIDEL, supra note 4, at 3 n.4.
Except as otherwise noted, the following biographical material is drawn from
FREIDEL, supra note 4. This is the standard and definitive full-length biography. Other
biographical material is listed in A Lieber Bibliography, with Annotations, 16 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2321 (1995). The best short biographical treatment is Carrington, supra, at 356-68.
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"gallophobic")/ and it was with feverish enthusiasm that in 1814
the teen-aged Lieber volunteered to fight against Napoleon.® He
was seriously wounded at Namur, a battle that was part of the Wa
terloo campaign. After a lengthy recuperation, he returned to his
studies in Berlin, becoming a disciple of Friedrich Jahn. In 1819
Jahn and many of his followers were arrested; Lieber was held in
prison for four months and upon his release forbidden to study at a
Prussian university. He then enrolled at the University of Jena,
from which, on the strength of a grand total of four months of
study, he received a Doctor of Philosophy degree in 1820. There
followed brief periods of study at Halle and Dresden.
In January 1822 Lieber left for Greece as a volunteer in the
war of independence with Ihrkey. This venture did not turn out as
planned, and, after a few months, a bitter and wholly disillusioned
Lieber made his way to Rome. There he fell in with the historian
Berthold Niebuhr, who was then the Prussian Ambassador to the
Vatican. He spent a year in Niebuhr's household, working as a tu
tor to the Ambassador's children, before returning to Germany to
begin studies at Halle. He was once again imprisoned, however,
this time on the basis of suspicions, apparently unfounded, that
he was involved in an assassination plot. Niebuhr's intervention
prompted his release, but he was not allowed to renew his studies
or to work.
In 1826, Lieber made his way to London as a stowaway. He
spent a year in that city, working as a tutor. In keeping with a
7 Nys quotes a letter from Sumner to his brother, in which he mentions "the 'gallophobia' which you have observed in our friend Lieber." Ernest Nys, Francis Lieber—His
Life and Work (pt. 1), 5 AM. J. INT'L L. 84, 87 (1911). In Hermeneutics and throughout
Lieber's work, England is generally the model of how to go about things; France almost
always the example of what not to do. See, e.g., LIEBER, supra note 5, at 181 [at 2018]. A
rare exception is the following: "Absolutism aided greatly in effecting that general plan of
education, which we behold in its vast results, in Prussia; let us take its best fruits, without
going through the same political process. France has done so." Id. at 221 [at 2044]. TTiis is
a rather backhanded compliment—France had the good sense to copy Prussia—but posi
tively generous compared to most of Lieber's work.
8 His own account is melodramatic but affecting;
When the day appointed for the enlistment of the volunteers arrived, we went
to my father, and said, "Well, then, we go; is it with your consent?" "Go to
your mother," he replied. We went to her; our hearts were big; she had suf
fered so much during the first campaign. With a half-choked voice I said;
"Mother, we go to be enrolled, shall we?" She fell into our arms, that noble
woman, and sobbed aloud. "Go," was all her bleeding heart allowed her to
utter; and had she been the mother of twenty sons, she would have sent them
all.
FRANCIS LIEBER, Personal Reminiscences of the Battle of Waterloo, in 1 THE MISCELLANE
OUS WRITINGS OF FRANCIS LIEBER, supra note 2, at 149,152.
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lifelong pattern, he was remarkably successful at what we would
now call networking. His circle included Jeremy Bentham and
John Austin, among other leading intellectual figures.
The following year, Lieber emigrated to America. He spent
the next six years in Boston, writing, teaching swimming, and asso
ciating with leading academic and political figures. As he had done
in London, he managed to fall in with the intellectual elite of Boston.® His major project during these years, and the first of many
instances of intellectual entrepreneurship, was the Encyclopedia
Americana, the first American general knowledge encyclopedia.
The first volume appeared in 1828; the thirteenth and last in 1833.
Lieber enlisted many of his friends to contribute. Among them
was Joseph Story, who wrote all of the many articles on legal
topics.
With the encyclopedia complete, Lieber moved to New York
City in 1832, and to Philadelphia in 1833. There he devoted a year
to producing a plan for Girard College, a school for orphans in
Philadelphia founded by a $5 million bequest from Stephen
Girard.^" Professor Lawrence Cunningham, who is in a position to
know, describes Lieber's plan for Girard College as "ingenious.""
As Frank Freidel writes:
Lieber enthusiastically prepared a plan of education in keeping
with the spectacular five-million-dollar Girard bequest. He
wished it to be the means of "carrying over some of the fruits of
long and toilsome experience in Europe . . . and planting them
[in] the fresh and rich soil of this new world." Consequently, he
liberally interpreted the wiU to embrace no mere orphan school
but a comprehensive polytechnic and teacher-training institu
tion. It would offer a wide range of courses and encompass
shops, laboratories, an observatory, and a press. He proposed
the discussion technique for teaching some courses, and wished
to bar corporal punishment on the upper levels.^^
9 And their guests. In 1831 Lieber met Alexis de Tocqueville during the Frenchman's
visit to Boston. The two remained friends and correspondents thereafter. Lieber trans
lated de Tocqueville and de Beaumont's Le Systeme Penitentiare for publication in the
United States and was de Tocqueville's American correspondent during the latter's brief
stint as a newspaper editor. ANDRE JARDIN, TOCQUEVILLE: A BIOGRAPHY 150-51,391-92
(Lydia Davis & Robert Hemenway trans., Farrar Straus Giroux 1988) (1984).
to Lieber uses Girard's will as an illustration in a couple of places in Hermeneutics. See
LIEBER, supra note 5, at 94-95, 100-01 [at 1957,1960-61].
It Lawrence A. Cunningham, Hermeneutics and Contract Default Rules: An Essay on
Lieber and Corbin, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 2225, 2247 n.95 (1995).
T2 FREIDEL, supra note 4, at 106 (quoting letter from Francis Lieber to Nicholas Biddle,
Sept. 1,1833).
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In his contribution to the present symposium, Dean Aviam Soifer
offers a quick guided tour of Lieber's hugely detailed plan, which
he considers pragmatic, nuanced, and enlightened.^^
Throughout these years, Lieber had unsuccessfully sought an
academic appointment. In 1835 he finally obtained a professorship
in history and political economy at South Carolina College (now
the University of South Carolina). There he remained for more
than twenty years, most of them spent trying to leave. Despite his
discontent, it was during this time that he produced his most sub
stantial pieces of scholarship. This is not the place for an account
of that work; the bibliography gives an indication of its volume and
scope. Three books stand out. One is the volume reprinted here.
Legal and Political Hermendutics. The second is the book of which
Hermeneutics was originally to be a part, the Manual of Political
Ethics,^'^ which dealt with the moral (or, to use a more modem
synonym, civic) and democratic responsibilities of citizens. Mike
Horenstein's article in this issue discusses the Political Ethics at
length, explicating Lieber's complex moral and political philoso
phy.^^ The third, and what was Lieber's most successful and longlasting work of political science/constitutional law, was On Civil
Liberty and Self-Governments^ which first appeared in 1853.^'
Each of these works went through multiple editions and was re
published posthumously by leading academics late in the nine
teenth century. Indeed, a fourth edition of Civil Liberty appeared
as late as 1901.
Lieber resigned from South Carolina College, after having
been denied the presidency of that institution, in December 1856,
and moved to New York City. Once in New York he obtained an
appointment at Columbia University. The major episode of
Lieber's years at Columbia—personally, politically, and profes
sionally—was, not surprisingly, the Civil War. Personally, the war
Aviam Soifer, Facts, Things, and the Orphans of Girard College: Francis Liebber,
Protopragmatist, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 2305 (1995).
14 FRANCIS LIEBER, MANUAL OF POLITICAL ETHICS (Boston, Charles C. Little & James
Brown 1838-1839). This work is illuminatingly discussed in Carrington, supra note 6, at
368-90.
15 Mike R. Horenstein, The Virtues of Interpretation in a Jural Society, 16 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2273 (1995).
15 FRANCIS LIEBER, ON CIVIL LIBERTY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT (Philadelphia, Lippincott, Grambo 1853). For a full discussion, see BROWN, supra 4; FREIDEL, supra note 4, at
266-74.

11 Civil Liberty appeared in a second edition in 1859. After Lieber's death, Theodore
Woolsey prepared a third edition, which appeared in 1874. A fourth edition was published
in 1901.
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was significant because Lieber's three sons all fought in it. Hamil
ton, who lost an arm, and Norman fought for the North; their older
brother, Oscar (sometimes said to have been Lieber's favorite) for
the South. Oscar was fatally wounded at Williamsburg, where Nor
man fought for the Union, and died ranting against his father.
The war also saw Lieber's most direct involvement in political
affairs. His antislavery sentiments, largely suppressed, at least in
public, during his years in the South, were now given free rein in
public speeches and through a series of antislavery pamphlets writ
ten for the Loyal Publication Society,^® where he was first chair of
the publication committee and then President. Though Lieber was
not always a satisfying or successful stylist in his adopted tongue,^'
some of his antislavery writing is quite powerful.^"
The Civil War also prompted what has proved to be Lieber's
most enduring legal contribution. In 1863, he drafted General Or
ders No. 100, setting out in 157 numbered paragraphs rules of con
duct for the Union armies in the field. Often referred to as the
Lieber Code or Lieber's Instructions, this was the first codification
of the laws of warfare.^^ It was this hugely influential work^^ that
prompted Secretary of State Elihu Root to say: "If our Society [the
18 The Society's mission is reflected in the following resolution, adopted at its inaugural
meeting on February 14,1863:
Resolved, That the object of this organization is, and shall be confined to, the
distribution of Journals and Documents of unquestionable and unconditional
loyalty throughout the United States, and particularly in the Armies now en
gaged in the suppression of the Rebellion, and to counteract, as far as possible,
the efforts now being made by the enemies of the Government and the advo
cates of a disgraceful peace to circulate journals and documents of a disloyal

cliflrdctcr*

FRANCIS LIEBER, NO PARTY Now, BUT ALL FOR OUR COUNTRY (1863) (inside front

cover).
19 For an example of how excruciating his writing could sometimes be, see LIEBER,
supra note 5, at 78 [at 1945] (sentence beginning "Yet to fix"). Fortunately sentences such
as this are the exception.
20 See, e.g., FRANCIS LIEBER, Amendments to the Constitution, Submitted to the Consid
eration of the American People, in 1 THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF FRANCIS LIEBER,
supra note 2, at 137,169-72.
21 For an overview, see Richard S. Hartigan, Introduction to LIEBER'S CODE AND THE
LAW OF WAR 1 (Richard S. Hartigan ed., 1983). The year before, Lieber had written
Guerilla Parties Considered with Regard to the Laws and Usages of War. This was part of
the same overall project. Lieber's Code is generally acclaimed as humane and progressive.
See, e.g., James F. Childress, Francis Lieber's Interpretation of the Laws of War: General
Orders No. 100 in the Context of His Life and Thought, 21 AM. J. JURIS. 34, 70 (1976)
(characterizing General Orders No. ICQ as "a monument and a signpost and, moreover, an
inspiration to constant reflection on morality and law in war"); George D. Haimbaugh, Jr.,
Humanitarian Law: The Lincoln-Lieber Connection, 13 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 245
(1982). For a dissenting view, however, see Chris af Jochnick & Roger Norman, The Legit
imation of Violence: A Critical History of the Laws of War, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J. 49, 65-66
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American Society of International Law], at once national and in
ternational, were about to choose a patron saint, and the roll were
to be called, my voice for one would answer, 'Francis Lieber.'
Following the war, Lieber was appointed by the War Depart
ment to catalogue and preserve the Confederate archives. He also
served as an umpire on the Mexican Claims Commission. Lieber
was transferred to the Columbia Law School in 1865, where he and
Theodore Dwight constituted the entire faculty, and remained at
Columbia until his death in 1872.
Ill
Why should we bother to read Lieber's Hermeneutics more
than a century and a half after its first publication? Echoing
Thomas Jefferson's well-knovm admonition about idealizing the
framers,^'* Lieber himself warns against being overpreoccupied
with older authorities:
We have in this particular to guard ourselves against an inordi
nate veneration of old authors, merely because they are old, or
against a too implicit reliance upon old authors, simply because
they have been relied upon so long. Science advances, and it
would be a matter of great regret if successive centuries were
unable to supersede by their labors some works of previous pe(1994) (objecting that the Code, in common with other statements of the law of war, under
cuts its apparent protections with an overbroad "military necessity" exception).
22 Lieber's Code was adopted by the Prussian Army in 1870 and was the basis of late
nineteenth-century international efforts to codify the law of war. It directly underlies the
Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, and elements of it can still be seen in the Geneva
Convention. See generally Hartigan, supra note 21, at 22-23; Telford Taylor, Foreword to
THE LAW OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY at xviii (Leon Friedman ed., 1972) (label
ling Lieber Code the "germinal document for codification of the laws of land warfare").
23 Elihu Root, Francis Lieber, 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 453, 466 (1913), reprinted in ELIHU
ROOT, ADDRESSES ON INTERNATIONAL SUBJECTS 89 (1916); see also Root, supra, at 459:
[W]e cannot fail to set a high estimate upon the service of the man who gave
form and direction and effectiveness to the civilizing movement by which man
at his best, through the concurrence of nations, imposes the restraint of rules of
right conduct, upon man at his worst, in the extreme exercise of force.
24 Some men look at constitutions with sanctimonious reverence, and deem them
like the ark of the covenant, too sacred to be touched. They ascribe to the men
of the preceding age a wisdom more than human, and suppose what they did to
be beyond amendment. I knew that age well; I belonged to it, and labored with
it. It deserved well of its country. It was very like the present, but without the
experience of the present; and forty years of experience in government is worth
a century of book-reading; and to this they would say themselves, were they to
rise from the dead.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in THE PORTABLE
THOMAS JEFFERSON 552, 558-59 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1975).
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nods, though they have justly enjoyed, and for a long time, the
reputation of authority.^®
Several of the authors in the present symposium have successfully
guarded themselves against the inordinate veneration of Francis
Lieber, and the purpose of reprinting Hermeneutics is not to en
courage a "too implicit reliance upon" it. Lieber will not smglehandedly guide us out of the contemporary interpretive thicket. To
the extent he is right, many of his insights have become received
wisdom and/or taken over by others.^^ And he is not al\^ys right,
he oversimplifies, his assumptions can be unsatisfying, he barely
hints at the relativism that even the least postmodern contempo
rary reader assumes. On the other hand, the contributors to this
symposium find much of value in Lieber's work and several—nota
bly Binder, Horenstein, Soifer, and Cunningham argue that
Lieber has important, neglected, and directly applicable insists
that modem lawyers and philosophers should not ignore, ine
reader can judge Lieber's value for him or herself. Let me suggest
a few reasons, however, why his work in general and Hermeneutics
in particular merit close attention.
In part Lieber is important because in so many ways he came
first "Lieber was the first . . . American law teacher to write a
work on law and economics. He was the first Amencan law
teacher to do survey research. He was the first American encyclooedist. He was arguably the first American legal comparatiyist.
To this accounting might be added Lieber's
education,^® criminal punishment,^' and property^^-all of which
25 LIEBER supra note 5, at 91-92 [at 1954-55]; see also id. at 186-^ [at 2021-23]. "We
are. indeed, as to experience, the old ones, and the past generations the young ones ....

26 MgSupra note 6, at 348 ("Lieber's works do not merit reading as a source of
insights unavailable in more accessible contemporary work. ).
27 Id. at 357 (footnotes omitted).
28 Lieber had relatively little formal education-not for want of
sistently unpopular classroom teacher. Nonetheless, he was
tical and spiritual value of education and had strong views on how it should P®
These included the autodidact's conviction that formal education is incomplete. I" addi
S^toThe Ptoi for Srard College, perhaps the most interesting, and most modem, of his
writings is an 1835 pamphlet entitled Remarks on the Relation Between
Crimr Backed up by statistics, here Lieber argued that comprehensive public education
was a critical weapon in the war against crime, as we would say
^Ziy
note 4 at 104 Several relevant essays appear in the Miscellaneous Writings. On the smy
TPOREL ZI^GES, 1 THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF FRANCIS LIEBER,
note
2 at 281- On The Necessity of Continued Self-Education, 1 THE MISCEL^NE
TTC OP FTANCIS LIEBER supra note 2, at 281 (1851 commencement address at South
Mm ^^fXAr^cienZnd the Modern Teacher of Politics.
WRMNOSTPR^^^^^^ LIEBER, supra note 2, at 329 (inaugural address at Columbia); and
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were strikingly original for their time.^^ As for Hermeneutics, it not
only introduced the term "hermeneutics,"^^ it broke "new ground
as the first substantial American work on legislation and on the
doctrine of precedent. It can fairly be said to be the first American
book applying techniques of literary criticism to legal
institutions."^^
More important than coming first, of course, is not also being
last. Lieber's work, though not often cited, was influential. Francis
Mootz asserts that, "[tjhe nineteenth-century hermeneutical tradi
tion in Continental philosophy has had an enduring effect on
American legal theory and practice through Lieber's scholar
ship."^'* This may be an overstatement. While Lieber's work has
surely infiltrated into modem legal culture, it has received little di
rect attention in this century. It is therefore hard to quantify his
importance in American intellectual and legal history. Yet this too
is one reason why Lieber merits a closer look. As Mike Horenstein
aptly puts it, "Lieber's thought... remains somewhere in the light

Religious Instruction in Colleges, 2 THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF FRANCIS LIEBER,
supra note 2, at 525.
29 In addition to Lieber's translation of de Beaumont and de Tocqueville, see On Penal
LMW, published as a pamphlet in 1838 and reprinted in 1 THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINOS
OF FRANCIS LIEBER, supra note 2, at 469 (endorsing solitary confinement and philoso
phizing about the nature of just and effective punishments). Solitary confinement was a
particular hobby horse of Lieber's.
30 See FRANCIS LIEBER, ESSAYS ON PROPERTY AND LABOUR (1841). It is this work to
which Carrington refers in describing Lieber as the first American law professor to write a
work of law and economics.
31 A complete bibliography of Lieber's writings appears in A Lieber Bibliography, with
Annotations, supra note 6, at 2321. I note only in passing that among his firsts, Lieber ran
what was apparently the first swimming school in the United States. See Hoeflich, supra
note 3, at 729.
32 Sanford Levinson & Steven Mailloux, Preface to INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERA
TURE at ix (Sanford Levinson & Steven Mailloux eds., 1988). Lieber was aware that his
readership would not be familiar with the term, and carefully laid out its meaning and
etymology. LIEBER, supra note 5, at 52 [at 1927].
33 Carrington, supra note 6, at 362; see also Hoeflich, supra note 3, at 729 (describing
Hermeneutics as the first American attempt to devise a set of canons of legal interpreta
tion); Roberta Kevelson, Semiotics and Methods of Legal Inquiry: Interpretation and Dis
covery in Law from the Perspective of Pierce's Speculative Rhetoric, 61 IND. L.J. 355, 356
(1986) (Lieber's Hermeneutics was "the first major expression of a semiotic approach to
legal discovery and interpretation").
34 Francis J. Mootz III, The New Legal Hermeneutics, 47 VAND. L. REV. 115, 116-17
(1994); see also Thomas G. Barnes, Introduction to FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLIT
ICAL HERMENEUTICS 4 (Thomas G. Barnes ed., 1994) (2d ed. 1839) (introduction sepa
rately published) ("[TJhis classic made a lasting contribution to American legal literature
and learning at a critical juncture in the development of our juristic tradition.").
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and shadow of American law, in need of both retrieval and
rearticulation."^®
Many of the particulars of Lieber's thought remain relevant to
our own efforts to grapple with law and governance in a constitu
tional democracy. For example, Paul Carrington has written else
where that Lieber's thoughts "resonate" with the contemporary
revival of civic Republicanism, and also overlap with "related
thoughts about democratic education and political ethics that can
be found in the work of such contemporary authors as Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson."^ The idea to which Lieber was
most attached, lurking in Hermeneutics and dominating his other
work, is captured in a favorite phrase: "No right without its duty,
no duty without its right."^^ This principle is as topical now as a
century and a half ago.^®
Such links to modem debates are numerous in Hermeneutics.
Needless to say, Lieber's general topic is, and always will be, rele
vant in any age. But there are more specific connections as well.
Lieber offers a set of interpretive canons, many of which overlap
with those that are still common in judicial opinions. Debate over
both the particulars and the general approach remains very much
with us. Although the canons are consistently ridiculed^^ and occa
sionally eulogized, reports of their death have always proven to
35 Horenstein, supra note 15, at 2279.
36 Carrington, supra note 6, at 348 (footnotes omitted).
37 Lieber was sufficiently taken with this idea that he apparently had it engraved on his
stationery. THAYER, supra note 2, at 45; Childress, supra note 21, at 48 n.44. He described
this principle as "perhaps the only thing I shall have contributed to jurisprudence when I
die." Letter from Francis Lieber to S.A. Allibone (Feb. 15,1870), quoted in id. at 48 n.44.
38 Lieber's slogan sounds more Hohfeldian than it is. Whereas Hohfeld's jural correla
tives of right and duty exist in two separate persons, or in one person and in the state,
Lieber's is a quasimoral principle that views right and duty as both residing in each individ
ual. He writes in Political Ethics:
The very condition of right is obligation; the only reasonableness of obligations
consists in rights. Since, therefore, a greater degree of civil liberty implies the
enjoyment of more extended acknowledged rights, man's obligations increase
with man's liberty. Let us, then, call that freedom of action which is deter
mined and limited by the acknowledgement of obligation. Liberty; freedom of
action without limitation by obligation. Licentiousness. The greater the liberty,
the more the duty. For, the less bound or circumscribed we are in our actions
from without, the more indispensable it becomes that we bind ourselves from
within, that is, by reason and conscience.
1 LIBBER, supra note 14, at 384.
39 The classic instance being, of course, Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Ap
pellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3
VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950) (detailing the "thrust and parry" of counteracting canons).
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have been exaggerated.'*" The courts are as wed to canons, at least
in writing opinions, whether or not in deciding cases, as ever. And
while many commentators have launched massive assaults on ca
nonical approaches, Lieber was only the first of many to endorse
such an approach, reaching to the present day most prominently in
the work of Cass Sunstein.'** In his contribution to this volume.
Prof. William Eskridge, Jr. points out Lieber's "prescience" with
regard to contemporary theoretical battles over statutory interpre
tation.'*^ Bruce Ackerman's description of the moment of constitu
tion-making as a period of "heightened mobilization'"*^ was
prefigured by Lieber's view that if there is a justification for
privileging "framers' intent" it is not that the framers knew more,
but that their circumstances "were more exciting to virtue.'"*'* The
40 See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Pragmatics and the Maxims of Interpretation, 1990 Wis.
L. REV. 1179,1180 ("[I]n the years following Llewellyn's work, it was conceivable that the
outdated reliance on maxims would soon give way to a more enlightened approach to
statutory interpretation. That optimism did not prove warranted.").
41 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 147-92 (1993). For a col
lection of recent academic discussion of interpretive canons, see Symposium, A Reevaluation of the Canons of Statutory Interpretation, 45 VAND. L. REV. 529 (1992). The
contributors to the present issue do not focus on the canonical nature of Lieber's proposals
per se. The usual attacks on such an approach focus on problems of internal contradiction,
indeterminacy, and democratic illegitimacy. To the extent they are valid, these criticisms
apply to Lieber's principles of interpretation and construction as fully as to other systems
of canons. In places, criticizing Lieber on these grounds is like shooting flsh in a barrel.
For example, he states that because "public welfare is the supremest law of every country,"
the obligation to further the public welfare applies to all interpretation. Lieber notes that
people too often (1) assume that the public welfare amounts only to economic prosperity
and (2) confuse their own interests with the public welfare. LIEBER, supra note 5, at 172-73
[at 2012-13]. It is very hard to take the public welfare constraint seriously as a neutral
principle limiting interpretation. To the contrary, it looks more like the opening for extrav
agant construction and personal whim. Such a concern is compounded when we are told
that the general welfare does not consist of what people "frequently" think it does, but
something else; viz., what Francis Lieber thinks it does.
All that said, in general I think Lieber offers his canons in a useful, realistic, and
reasonably flexible way. As Paul Carrington has written, he would not have been surprised
by the Llewellyn critique. Carrington, supra note 1, at 306.
42 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., "Fetch Some Soupmeat," 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 2209,
2222 (1995).
43 Bruce Ackerman, Discovering the Constitution,93 YALE L.J. 1013,1023,1049 (1984).

44 It frequently happens, that a fundamental law of a country is adopted at a pe
riod when universal enthusiasm renders purity of action more common than is
the case in easy times, when self-devotion is little called for and selfishness
diffuses itself in all classes. Thus it was a great epoch when the American colo
nies declared themselves free, and there can be no doubt that there was more
self-devotion in that congress at Philadelphia than in our easy times will be
found in an equally large number of men. Those times were more exciting to
virtue, and if we speak of the patriotic signers, there is truth in the expression
"wisdom of our fathers." Not that they were better organized beings, for the
favorite saying of Lord Nelson, that there are as good fish left in the sea as have
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list could be continued. The point is that Lieber's issues were our
issues, even in the particulars, and reconsidering his insights while
critically evaluating his blind spots should help us to "supersede by
[our] labors some works of previous periods.'"*^
Hermeneutics speaks to today's readers not only because its
subject is relevant. In certain ways Lieber displays a distinctly
modern cast of mind as well. I would point to two particular as
pects of Lieber's approach that help ensure his continued rele
vance. Most obviously, he prefigures a central tenet of modem
literary theory: "the ubiquity of interpretation in the process of
reading every text—even where it seems to us as readers that no
active interpretation is taking place at all.'"^ As Wolfgang
Holdheim explains in his contribution to the present volume,
Lieber (following Friedrich Schleiermacher) was at the then-cut
ting edge of a "Copemican revolution" in understanding that fi
nally reco^ized that interpretation is unavoidable, that no text
interprets itself.'*'
The second aspect of Lieber's analysis with a contemporary
feel that I would highlight concems categorization. For the modera reader, much of what is tedious about nineteenth-century legal
writing is the endless categorizing: scholarship as taxonomy. List
ing categories seems a poor substitute for understanding them, and
the whole enterprise is undermined by our suspicion that the cate
gories do not reflect any ultimate, natural truth but are only a con
structed and artificial system. As Larry Lessig points out, Lieber
undeniably had the nineteenth-century (and, one might add, Ger
manic) tendency toward categorization.'*® But Lieber also was
aware that his categories constantly threatened to collapse, that
differences were ones of degree more than kind, and that other
categorizations were possible. For example, he recognizes that the
central distinction of his whole work, the difference between intercome out of it, is very true, but the combination of circumstances was more
favorable.
LIEBER, supra note 5, at 187-88 [at 2022]; see also id. at 219-22 [at 2043-45],
45 Id. at 91 [at 1955] (originally quoted in text at supra note 25).
45 Levinson & Mailloux, supra note 32, at x.
47 See Wolfgang Holdheim, A Hermeneutic Thinker, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 2153, 2156
(1995); see also William G. Hammond, Appendix to LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEU
TICS, supra note 5, at 245-46 [at 2063] (Note C: On the Province of Legal Hermeneutics).
48 See Lawrence Lessig, The Limits of Lieber, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 2249,2254 (1995).
This surfaces in many places in Hermeneutics, for example in the lengthy breakdown of the
different types of interpretation and construction, LIEBER, supra note 5, at 54-70 [at 192839], and in the categorization of different types of constitutions, id. at 167-68 [at 2009-10].
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pretation and construction, will not always hold in practice, how
ever clear it is in theory:
It lies likewise in the nature of things that, in many cases, inter
pretation and construction must closely approach to one an
other; but the distinction is clear. Food and poison are very
distinct things, although in some cases they approach so closely
that it would be difficult to decide, with absolute certainty,
which term we ought to choose.'*®
At the outset he distinguishes interpretation from conjecture, only
immediately to concede that "[sjtill it lies in the nature of things,
that, in some cases, they approach to each other.
Likewise "ob
jects of the physical world are not so distinctly defined from each
other as they appear to be at first glance. Innumerable transitions
exist between them."^^ And, in a sentence added for the third edi
tion: "Even sensations are not absolutely divided by a line of de
marcation; the highest delight borders on pain."^^ \^ile rejecting
"literal interpretation" and insisting on recognizing "tropes as
tropes," he also acknowledges that "it is very difficult to say where
the literal signification of a word ends, and the figurative begins.
Moreover, while words have a core of clear meaning, they become
more uncertain "the farther we remove from that centre, some
what like certain territories of civilized people bordering on wild
regions."^'* For this reader, at least, Lieber's recognition—even his
frustration, perhaps—that his categories are so unstable redeems
much of what might otherwise be wooden and artificial.^^
Finally, Lieber's mind was sufficiently lively that one comes
across nuggets of insight or arresting phrases in even his dreariest
and least interesting passages. For example, in my view the last
two chapters of Hermeneutics are the least successful of the book.
The discussion of precedents is noncommittal and unsophisticated
(this may be where Lieber's lack of legal training was most inca
pacitating). Indeed, it is one place where the editor outshines the
49 LFFIBER, supra note 5, at 53 [at 1927-28].
50 Id. at 9 [at 1898-99],
51 Id. at 22 [at 1907].
52 Id. at 23 [at 1907-08].
53 Id. at 54-55 [at 1928-29].
54 Id. at 15 [at 1902]. As Eskridge points out, Lieber here exactly prefigures H.L.A.
Hart's distinction between the core and the penumbra. See Eskridge, supra note 42, at
2213.
55 Avi Soifer points to a related aspect of Lieber's thinking: his relative comfort with
paradox. Soifer, supra note 13, at 2310. In particular, Soifer writes, "Lieber sought to
struggle towards what he repeatedly claimed to be unreachable." Id. Categorization may
be one of those unreachable things. Certainly, Lieber's acceptance of paradox brings him
closer to a modem audience than many of his contemporaries.
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author.^® Yet even here there is the occasional striking proposition
or turn of phrase: for example, the aphoristic observation that "the
more the advocates of a political measure feel themselves obliged
to rely on precedents, the less they ought to be trusted,"®' or the
objection, in keeping with his keenly dynamic sense of law and his
tory, that an "idolatry of precedents ... at times has slaughtered
Justice at her own altars."®®
In commenting on the greater value of more recent authors,
Lieber notes the advantage that "they relate to cases applying to
the same circumstances and conditions with our own; they speak
the same language with ourselves."®' Lieber is decidedly not a re
cent author, and circumstances and conditions have changed vastly
since his day. To a surprising extent, however, he does "speak the
same language with ourselves."
IV
Most people are at least surprised, if not astonished, to leam
that in 1837 someone wrote a book called Legal and Political Hermeneutics. "Hermeneutics" seems so (post)modem, so trendy, that
it is a bit like learning that Robert Fulton, in addition to developing
the steamboat, was also doing important work with personal com
puters. Law professors usually see "the very word 'hermeneutics'
[as] a refugee from the English departments of the 1970s" that has
only recently become "one of the darlings of current scholarly fash
ion."®" My comments in the previous section notwithstanding, the
book itself is in fact less ahead of its time than its title suggests.
Had it been called "Rules of Statutory and Constitutional Interpre
tation," as it could have been, it would sound a good deal less eso
teric and intriguing to the modem ear.®^ In this section, I will
56 See LIEBER, supra note 5, at 312-30 [at 2093-2105] (Hammond comments).

57 Id. at 203 [at 2033],
58 Id. at 208-09 [at 2036].
59 Id. at 226 [at 2047].
60 Paul Campos, That Obscure Object of Desire: Hermeneutics and the Autonomous
Legal Text, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1065,1068 (1993) (reporting results of Westlaw search that
showed 37 law review uses of the word from 1982-1984 and 297 from 1990-1992).
61 Lieber's odd title dismayed at least some of his readers. Chancellor Kent's son, Wil
liam, objected: "What, in God's name, made you choose 'Hermeneutics'! Had you called
your . . . book 'principles of Interpretation,' . .. many an honest fellow, now frightened
away, would have read & enjoyed the writings." FREIDEL, supra note 4, at 175 (quoting a
Dec. 19,1843 letter from William Kent to Francis Lieber). On the title pages of his later
works, Lieber was consistently identified as, among other things, the author of "Principles
of Legal and Political Interpretation"—a work which does not exist. See, e.g., CIVIL LIB
ERTY, supra note 16, at title page (1853,2d ed. 1859,3d ed. 1877); MANUAL OF POLITICAL
ETHICS, supra note 14, at title page; 1 & 2 THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS, supra note 2,
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briefly describe the interpretive program that lies behind Lieber's
fancy title, and summarize the discussions of Lieber's views that
are provided by the other contributors to this volume.
A
Lieber is today best remembered for his codification of the
laws of war. While this project was in some ways a sidelight (one
of many) to his primary work in political science and constitutional
law, it is, in a way, altogether fitting that Lieber be so identified
with the law of war. For it is the most extreme (or, perhaps, naive
and optimistic) example of his deep commitment to, and belief in,
the rule of law. For Lieber it was a mark of civilized society that it
subject the acts of soldiers during wartime—what seems the most
lawless of circumstances—to a set of written rules of conduct.
A preoccupation with the rule of law, or, as he usually phrased
it, "the supremacy of law,"®^ dominates all of Lieber's work. From
many possible instances, let me offer just one other slightly curious
illustration, written right at the outset of his American career. In a
collection of sketches about travels in the United States, Lieber
gave three reasons why political defeat does not make people in
sane in this country One is that the frequency of elections allows
a wait-til-next-year attitude that prevents profound discourage
ment, another that "no dishonor whatever" attaches to political de
feat. But the third, and, one senses, most important reason, is that
"the people know very well that their Uves and property are not in
jeopardy, that whatever party may come in or go out, the broad
principle of the whole system will be acted upon, the general laws
will be observed."®^ Warming to his subject, he goes on to assert
that the idea that "liberty exists only where the majority can do
what they please"^® is a "monstrous idea":®®
[0]n the contrary, the degree of existing liberty can justly be
measured only by the degree of undoubted protection which the
minority enjoy, and the degree in which the sovereign, be he one
at title pages. One cannot but wonder whether this paraphrase of the actual title and subti
tle reflected editorial discomfort with the "h" word.
See, e.g., LIEBER, supra note 5, at 40, 128 [at 1919,1983].
63 In contrast to France, of course, where the asylums were apparently crammed with
the losers of political contests.
6* 2 FRANCIS LIEBER, THE STRANGER IN AMERICA: COMPRISING SKETCHES OF THE
MANNERS, SOCIETY, AND NATIONAL PECULIARITIES OF THE UNITED STATES, IN A SERIES
OF LETTERS TO A FRIEND IN EUROPE 25 (London, Bentley 1835).

65 Id. at 26.
66 Id. at 25; cf. supra note 37 (quoting Lieber's distinction between liberty and
licentiousness).
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or many, or represented by the majority, is restricted, by funda
mental laws, from acting on sudden impulses and impassioned
caprices.®^

Hermeneutics cannot be understood, I think, except in light of
this preoccupation with the rule of law. Lieber rejects either of two
approaches to government. First, he insists that government be
limited by law. Simply to abandon law in favor of discretion or
common sense is to invite tyranny. Such a scheme is appropriate
for running the family because the head has the best interests of
the other family members at heart; but as an approach for running
a country it spells disaster for personal and civil liberties.^® Second,
Lieber understands that in a government of laws, not men, the laws
will not speak for themselves. As his aphoristic first sentence indi
cates, and as he reiterates time and again, interpretation is always
necessary. Yet false interpretations of one sort or another had
LIEBER, supra note 64, at 26.
68 The debate is of course still very much with us. As I was preparing this essay, Cass
Sunstein reviewed Philip Howard's The Death of Common Sense in the New York Times.
Howard argues that America is now choking on law. He would trade in the modern ver
sion of the rule of law for a regime based on common sense and cooperation. See PHILIP
K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: How LAW IS SUFFOCATING AMERICA
(1994). Sunstein reminds us, however, that
[o]nce freed from rules, public officials and private citizens may exercise their
discretion invidiously. They may be confused, biased or corrupt. Without
rules, it may be very hard to monitor whether people are doing what they
should do. And without fair process, officials may make damaging mis
takes. ... In some contexts rules and rights are indispensable; the alternatives
would be much worse.
Cass R. Sunstein, Land of 4,000 Unreadable Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1995, § 7 (Book
Review), at 12. Sunstein does not cite Lieber, but he easily could have.
On the other hand, one of Howard's central contentions is pure Lieber. Echoing, in
his title and elsewhere, Lieber's repeated invocations of common sense, Howard launches
a particular attack on overdetailed rules. The result of too much detail is that "[m]odem
law is unknowable." HOWARD, supra, at 30. The misguided "quest for protection through
certainty" leads only to "arbitrary power." Id. at 32. "Loopholes only exist because of
precise rules. The Constitution, a short document of general principles, has no loopholes."
Id. at 43. It is Lieber who offers the classic argument as to the futility of "attempting to
speak with absolute clearness and endless specifications." LIEBER, supra note 5, at 19 [at
1905]. This is the point of the famous soupmeat hypothetical. See id. at 18 [at 1904-05]; see
also id. at 150-51 [1997-98] (noting superiority of general over detailed instructions to
soldiers and diplomats); Eskridge, supra note 42 (discussing soupmeat hypothetical). In
deed, Howard and Lieber agree that efforts to constrain power and discretion through
detail have, perversely, the opposite effect. See LIEBER, supra note 5, at 22 [at 1907] ("Tlie
more we strive in a document to go beyond plain clearness and perspicuity, the more we do
increase, in fact, the chances of sinister interpretation."). Lieber himself had to grapple
with a detailed set of instructions in preparing the plan for Girard College. One wonders
whether he learned from that experience, consciously or not, the futility of highly detailed
prescriptions. See Soifer, supra note 13, at 2309-14 (discussing broad latitude Lieber took
in interpreting Girard's will).
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been the tool of tyranny.®^ Therefore, if law is to be a bulwark
against tyranny, interpretive approaches cannot be up for grabs.
The goal of Hermeneutics was to outline an interpretive approach
that would, if honestly applied, ensure the rule of law. Lieber was
not a literary critic, he was a political scientist with an intense con
cern about good government and the avoidance of tyranny. For
this hater of Napoleon, wounded at Waterloo and imprisoned in
Prussia for his political beliefs, the concern over government
abuses was much more than theoretical. His Hermeneutics—which
was originally designed as part of a Manual—was practical, not
theoretical, and it was aimed toward the achievement of sound
government.
Paul Carrington sees both Lieber's work and its 1880 republi
cation as responses to particular, though opposite, politico-legal
currents of the times. Carrington shows that Lieber and William
Hammond, editor of the 1880 edition, were pursuing quite different
goals.™ At the time of its original publication, the work was a re
sponse to the then-prevailing view that judges were merely politi
cians in robes and the resulting Jacksonian efforts to curb judicial
independence. Lieber's central premise is that judges "have moral
duties to subordinate their personal preferences and determine
textual meanings disinterestedly" and "a unifying aim of Herme
neutics is to make it matter as little as possible whether a judge is
personally of one persuasion or another."'^ By 1880, the tide had
turned; Langdellianism, conceiving law as an autonomous and
technocratic discipline, was ascendant. In this setting, the 1880 edi
tion (like the new editions of much of Lieber's other work around
the same time) was a response from the opposite side of the law-ascreation versus law-as-discovery divide than the original publica
tion. Now Lieber was offered as a bulwark against law's "political

69 LIEBER, supra note 5, at 38 [at 1918] (stressing indispensability of law and lawyers to
avoid the abuses that would flow if justice was subjective and hinged on the unconstrained
discretion of the judge or sovereign); id. at 53 [at 1928] (construction is "dangerous" but
indispensable); id. at 76-77 [at 1944] (decrying inconsistent or double interpretations as a
common tool of tyrannical governments); id. at 102 [at 1962] (mocking those who would
allow authorities to rely on their intuitions and sense of the public weal rather than faith
fully interpreting the Constitution); id. at 124 [at 1979] (bad faith interpretation has too
often been resorted to to rob people of their property); id. at 190-91 [at 2024] (emphasizing
value of precedent as an indicator of true law and as a bulwark against governmental "en
croachment in the name of law").
70 Paul D. Carrington, William Gardiner Hammond and the Lieber Revival, 16 CAR-

Dozo L. REV. 2135 (1995).
71 Id. at 2139.
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sterilization by the likes of professional technocrats such as
Langdell.""'^
B
What, then, does Lieber propose? His starting point is that
interpretation is always necessary. Because direct communication
between minds is impossible, we must rely on intermediaries, on
signs. For a long catalogue of reasons, the use of signs will inescap
ably create confusion and uncertainty. The task of interpretation is
to eliminate this confusion. For Lieber, it is essential to the proper
functioning of government, the avoidance of tyranny, and the par
ticipation of the citizen in public life to agree on a set of principles
by which the inevitable interpretive tasks will be successfully
performed.
"Bvo of our commentators place this project within the larger
hermeneutic tradition. Professor Wolfgang Holdheim explains that
Lieber's conception was part of a fundamental shift in that herme
neutic tradition, which was in turn part of the larger "Copemican
revolution" in the history of ideas.'^ The shift was from a focus on
the external world to the world of the mind, and within hermeneutics from a belief that interpretation is "artless"—that understand
ing is automatic and meaning self-evident—to a recognition that
interpretation is always and everywhere necessary. As Holdheim
explains, key to this shift, both generally and particularly for Fran
cis Lieber, was Lieber's teacher, Friedrich Schleiermacher. Exam
ining the particulars of Lieber's scheme, Holdheim guides us
through Lieber's hermeneutics and situates him in a line that be
gins with Schleiermacher and leads to Martin Heidegger and HansGeorg Gadamer.
Guyora Binder also identifies Schleiermacher as a critical in
fluence on Lieber and provides a thorough summary of
Schleiermacher's thought.'"* In Binder's view, however, Lieber was
equally influenced by Whig legal thought of the early nineteenth
century, particular as articulated by Joseph Story, who was Lieber's
friend and a substantial contributor to the Encyclopedia Ameri
cana. In Hermeneutics, Lieber "bred Schleiermacher's romantic
72 Id. at 2152.
73 Holdheim, supra note 47, at 2156.
74 Guyora Binder, Institutions and Linguistic Conventions: The Pragmatism of Lieber's
Legal Hermeneutics, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 2169 (1995).
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philology with the Whig's institutional positivism, to spawn an ac
count of law as the hermeneutic perpetuation of institutions.""'^
C
Lieber begins with a modem premise—the inescapability of
interpretation—but seeks to downplay the more radical implica
tions of the premise, constructing a hermeneutics that will calm
concerns that the failure of texts to speak directly might result in
meaning depending on the interpreter rather than the text. In par
ticular, a text can have only one meaning, and that meaning was
put there by the author and is, by definition, what the author in
tended. Lieber recognizes the external influences on interpreta
tion; his goal, though, is to provide the rules by which they are
controlled and the text's "one true meaning" perceived and agreed
upon by all. Depending on your view, Lieber's "one true meaning"
idea supplements, counterbalances, undercuts, or obliterates the
initial premise.
Georgia Wamke would take the last of these views.'^ She re
jects Lieber's scheme as simply too antiquated and naive to be of
much value today. She contrasts Lieber's insistence on "one true
meaning" and his argument that "predestined [i.e., prejudiced] in
terpretation" is illegitimate with Gadamer's view that meaning is
always multiple and that all interpretation is oriented by prejudices
or assumptions interpreters inescapably bring to the task of under
standing. In other words, Lieber's project—to develop a set of
principles that will ensure "neutral" and "accurate" interpretation,
by whomever applied—is doomed from the outset. Working in
stead with a Gadamerian conception. Professor Wamke illustrates
the opposite approach by rearticulating the controversy over abor
tion as a hermeneutic conversation. By acknowledging the ines
capability of multiple meanings of the key norms and concepts in
this debate ("liberty," "life," "autonomy," "responsibility," etc.),
she argues, we might understand and leam from others' positions
rather than close-mindedly, and fruitlessly, arguing for our own.
William Eskridge, though somewhat more taken with Lieber
than is Wamke, agrees with her assessment of his limitations. The
failure to fully account for the fact that all meaning is situational,
and that different readers will therefore inevitably construct differ75 Id. at 2184.
76 Georgia Wamke, The One True Sense, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 2191 (1995).
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ent meanings from the same text, hugely reduces the value of
Lieber's scheme."'''
Some other contributors see Lieber as more subtle and sophis
ticated. Thus, Professor Holdheim, while agreeing with Wamke
that a "one true meaning" approach to texts is in general wholly
inadequate, rehabilitates Lieber by "interpreting" him to be offer
ing an instrumentally useful fiction. In the legal setting, texts
should be treated as if they have one true meaning.^® Guyora
Binder offers an account of Lieber as a pragmatist whose nod to
one-true-meaning intentionalism makes more palatable what is in
fact an endorsement of significant judicial discretion.^® And Mike
Horenstein contends that even if "the present discourse on legal
interpretation [is] richer, more sophisticated and varied," recover
ing Lieber remains a necessity despite his apparent limitations.®®
D
At the heart of Lieber's scheme is his distinction between in
terpretation and construction. Understanding a text begins with
interpretation: "the art of finding out the true sense of any form of
words; that is, the sense which their author intended to convey, and
of enabling others to derive from them the same idea which the
author intended to convey."®^ The overall goal of all of Lieber's
interpretive principles is to avoid manipulative and disingenuous—
in a word, willful—interpretations. Valid interpretations require
good faith (a requirement insisted upon time and again in Hermeneutics), common sense, a disdain for literal readings, respect for
authorial intention, sensitivity to context and purpose, and a pref
erence for what is "probable, fair, and customary" over "the im
probable, unfair and unusual."®^
Where interpretation does not "suffice," however, "we must
have recourse to construction."®® "Construction is the drawing of
77 Eskridge, supra note 42, at 2222-24.
78 Holdheim, supra note 47, at 2162-63.
79 Binder, supra note 74, at 2185-89.
80 Horenstein, supra note 15, at 2273-74. I should mention here an article that does not
even cite Lieber, but which is directly relevant to the question of whether his hermeneutics
can withstand twentieth-century reconceptions. Francis Mootz has attempted to reformu
late the traditional view of the rule of law—Lieber's view—in light of Gadamerian herme
neutics. Francis J. Mootz III, Is the Rule of Law Possible in a Postmodern World?, 68
WASH. L. REV. 249 (1993). Mootz's analysis might also be applied to salvage Lieber from
the Gadamerian critique.
81 LIEBER, supra note 5, at 11 [at 1900].
82 Id. at 109 [at 1967].
83 Id. at 50 [at 1926].
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conclusions respecting subjects, that lie beyond the direct expres
sion of the text, from elements known from and given in the text—
conclusions which are in the spirit, though not within the letter of
the text."®^ Most often, construction is necessary where unantici
pated situations have arisen or background circumstances have
changed. Interpretation is either impossible because the text sim
ply does not address the problem at hand or (what is perhaps the
same thing) interpretation is wrongheaded because to take the text
at face value would produce a result wholly at odds with the au
thor's goal.®^ The essence of construction is parallelism—what we
would call, but Lieber is careful to distinguish from, reasoning by
analogy.®®
Lieber sees the interpretation and construction as sequential,
though related. In general, what goes for interpretation also goes
for construction; above all, both require good faith, common sense,
and a sensitivity to the purpose and the causes of the law. In addi
tion, Lieber lays down a number of specific principles of construc
tion, many wholly familiar to readers of modem judicial opinions:
the text cannot be understood to demand the impossible; privileges
are to be construed in favor of the non-privileged party; the older a
text, the more extensive should be its construction; the weak enjoy
the benefit of the doubt; a compact is construed closely and ambi
guities resolved against the drafter.®'
Among Lieber's changes for the third edition of Hermeneutics
was the claim that the "distinction is now . . . very generally ac
cepted."®® Even his editor felt obliged to disagree with that opti
mistic assessment,®^ however, and at present it can be reported that
84 Id. at 44 [at 1921]; see also id. at 46 [at 1923] ("construction signifies the discovery of
the spirit, principles and rules that ought to guide us according to the text").
85 "[T]here are considerations which ought to induce us to abandon interpretation, or
in other words to sacrifice the direct meaning of a text to considerations still weightier;
especially not to slaughter justice, the sovereign object of laws, for the law itself, [which is
only] the means of obtaining it." Id. at 103 [at 1962].
86 Construction also has a second aspect which is really quite separate: reading a text so
as to comply with "principles or rules of superior authority." Thus, a statute must be "con
strued" to be consistent with the Constitution, an administrative act construed to be consis
tent with the underlying statute, and so on. The two aspects of construction are linked in
Lieber's mind in that they both involve "subjects that lie beyond the direct expression of
the text." Id. at 47 [at 1923]. But in the one setting those subjects are derived, however,
loosely, from the text, in the other they are imposed on it.
87 Lieber's 16 rules of construction are summarized at id. at 136-37 [at 1987-88].
88 Id. at 50 n.* [at 1925 n.9].
89 Id. at 50 n.5 [at 1926 n.9]. On the other hand, an admirer wrote in 1873 that the
distinction "has been generally adopted by legal writers." See THAYER, supra note 2, at 25,
reprinted in 1 THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF FRANCIS LIEBER, supra note 2, at 13.
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the construction versus interpretation distinction has almost wholly
failed to survive as a matter of vocabulary. In isolated areas of
private law courts and commentators use something like this for
mulation.^ And half anyway of Lieber's vocabulary is used by
constitutional scholars, for whom "interpretivism" refers (some
what counterintuitively, but more or less consistently with Lieber's
usage) to approaches to the Constitution that are relatively textbound and originalist. Still, for the most part the two words are
deemed perfect synonyms. Judges and commentators seem happy
to be equipped with two identical terms, since it allows them to
switch from one to the other simply to avoid redundancy.®^
While Lieber's vocabulary is not widely adopted, the ideas it
reflects are real: there are two separate types of interpretation—or,
more accurately, a continuum of interpretive approaches.
All of the articles in this issue explore the distinction between
interpretation and construction to some degree. Four focus on it in
particular, addressing interpretation and construction in the com
mon law, statutory, and constitutional settings.®^
90 For example, black letter principles of conflicts of law distinguish between the inter
pretation of a will and its construction. "Interpretation" is deemed an essentially factual
inquiry into the testator's intent. EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS
809 (2d ed. 1992). In contrast, the "process of completing or presuming the intention of
the testator as to matters over which he could have exercised testamentary direction, is
called construction." Id. at 810; see also id. at 818. It is said that conflicts rules only come
into play with regard to questions of construction and not of interpretation, though at least
to this outsider it does not seem necessary to pinpoint the dividing line, which will take
care of itself as soon as the court grapples with particular legal rules. See Symeon C. Symeonides. Exploring the "Dismal Swamp," 47 LA. L. REV. 1029, 1073-74 (1987).
91 See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 114 S. Ct. 2381,2384 (1994) ("the Secre
tary's interpretation is a reasonable construction of the regulatory language") (emphasis
added); City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 114 S. Ct. 1588,1593,1594 n.5
(1994) ("Petitioners contend that our interpretation of § 3001(i)"; "petitioners' contention
that our construction renders § 3001(i)"; "In view of our construction of § 3001(i), we need
not consider whether an agency interpretation") (emphasis added); Good Samaritan Hosp.
V. Shalala, 113 S. Ct. 2151, 2161 (1993) ("where the agency's interpretation of [its regula
tion] is at least as plausible as competing ones, there is little, if any, reason not to defer to
its construction") (emphasis added); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 467 U.S. 837,842,844,865 (1985) (referring interchangeably to EPA's "interpreta
tion" and EPA's "construction" of the Clean Air Act).
92 Missing from this list is the administrative setting. While agency interpretation is a
type of statutory interpretation, it does not necessarily raise the same issues as statutory
interpretation in the courts. Indeed, one might use Lieber's distinction to describe the
division of labor between courts and agencies established in Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837. In
Chevron the Supreme Court set out a two-step process for courts to apply in reviewing
agency interpretations of statutes. Lieber's interpretation corresponds to Chevron's step
one: "First, always, is the question of whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter
" Id.
at 842. The premise here is pure Lieber: Congress had an intent, the statute has one true
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Professor Lawrence Cunningham explores the difference be
tween Lieber's understanding of the distinction and Corbin's some
what different understanding. Whereas for Lieber construction
still grew out of the text being construed, for Corbin it was external
to it—the imposition of a legal norm separate from the agreement
or intentions of the parties. Corbin's dichotomy corresponds more
accurately to "what judges actually do in contracts cases," but
Lieber's view, Cunningham suggests, "offered remarkably pre
scient prescriptions for" how to do it.^^ Specifically, Cunningham
brings Lieber's Hermeneutics fully into the late twentieth century
by investigating how it can help resolve the most provocative de
bate in contemporary contracts scholarship: the struggle over de
fault rules. Cunningham reconfigures the default rules debate
using Lieber's distinctions between different types of construction.
William Eskridge focuses on the part of Legal and Political
Hermeneutics that is most familiar to the modem legal academy:
the soupmeat hypothetical. Lieber shows how an apparently sim
ple instruction from housekeeper to domestic—"fetch some
soupmeat"—is only understood because of a raft of unspoken con
ditions and implicit provisos. Lieber's particular point is that it is
at best unnecessary, perhaps misleading, and in any event impossi
ble to be comprehensive. Developing the hypothetical far more
than Lieber himself had, Eskridge uses it to explicate how Lieber's
principles of interpretation and construction operate in a specific

meaning, and through interpretation (which is not the same as a literal reading or the selfevident unfolding of the statute by itself and may require more than simply reading the
statute and seeing what it says) the court comes to understand Congress's nieaning. A
court moves to Chevron's "step two," upholding any reasonable or permissible agency
reading, if "the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue," id. at 843,
that is, if Congress has not "directly addressed the precise question at issue," id. at 843 n.9
(emphasis added). In these circumstances. Congress has not resolved the issue and the
Court will simply accept any reasonable agency determination. Or, as Lieber puts it: "In
terpretation, seeking but for the true sense, forsakes us when the text is no longer directly
applicable; because the utterer, not foreseeing this case, did not mean it, therefore, it has
no true sense in this particular case." LIEBER, supra note 5, at 111 [at 1969] (emphasis in
original). Construction involves subjects "beyond the direct expression of the text." Id. at
44 [at 1921] (emphasis added). Compare Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (noting possible causes
of statutory ambiguity) with LIEBER, supra note 5, at 27,53-54 [at 1910-11,1927-28] (giving
similar list).
Professors Davis and Pierce describe Chevron in just these terms, though I would not
assume that they have Lieber in mind. 1 KENNETH C. DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.3, at 112 (1994) (stating that when a court or agency
resolves a policy dispute under a vague statute, it "is not engaged in statutory interpreta
tion. It is engaged in statutory construction.").
93 Cunningham, supra note 11, at 2234.
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setting.^ In doing so, he links Lieber's principles with contempo
rary debates over statutory interpretation, noting Lieber's "presci
ence" in anticipating, and providing some lessons for, textualism,
the legal process school, intentionalism, and evolutive interpreta
tion. (I discuss in the next section Eskridge's ultimate reservations
about Lieber's interpretive guidelines).
Eskridge's discussion helps us understand why Lieber's dis
tinction between interpretation and construction matters so much.
More is at issue here than a descriptive taxonomical pedantry. The
point of the distinction is a prescriptive insistence on the legitimacy
of a relatively creative and far-reaching approach to texts. Guyora
Binder puts this most forcefully, arguing that Lieber's "reduction
of intent to language was merely a stratagem to justify an active
interpreter."®^ Certainly there is no disputing Lieber's aversion to
narrow, blindly textual interpretation. Acknowledging that "[w]e
have first to settle whether construction is at all admissible," Lieber
finds the answer clear—indeed, construction is "absolutely indis
pensable.In construction is salvation: "It is . . . construction
alone which saves us .. . from sacrificing the spirit of a text or the
object, to the letter of the text, or to the means by which that ob
ject was to be obtained ... [and through construction that we avoid
producing] the very opposite of what it was purposed to effect."®^
Binder's view of the liberality of Lieber's approach is borne
out by Avi Soifer's discussion of the plan for Girard College. Here
is the best example we have of Lieber himself actually faced with
the sort of interpretative challenges that are the subject of Hermeneutics. Girard had been quite specific with regard to the details of
the new school, its educational program, and the composition of its
student body. His two most famous and troubling restrictions were
first that the students be only white male orphans, and second that
no "ecclesiastic, missionary, or minister of any sect whatsoever"
even be allowed on the premises. Soifer shows that Lieber read
both restrictions quite liberally. Indeed, Lieber's whole approach
Eskridge, supra note 42. Eskridge also discusses the soupmeat hypothetical in his
recent book on statutory interpretation. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATU
TORY INTERPRETATION 40, 53, 56-57,125-28, 246-47 (1994).

95 Binder, supra note 74, at 2185. Binder infers a second, related normative lesson. He
links the interpretation/construction distinction to the rules/standards distinction, and
stresses Lieber's dismissal of the possibility of comprehensive legislative specificity. He
then reasons backwards from Lieber's endorsement of construction by judges to an en
dorsement of legislation that is construed rather than interpreted, that is, standards rather
than rules.
96 LIEBER, supra note 5, at 50 [at 1926].
97 Id. at 45 [at 1922].
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in drawing up the plan was to emphasize Girard's implicit instruc
tions and the spirit of the bequest rather than the explicit language
of the will.®®
Larry Lessig picks up the normative aspect of Lieber's distinc
tion in the context of constitutional interpretation. Drawing on
and elaborating on an earlier article,®® Lessig analogizes construc
tion to translation and insists, following Lieber, that such a free
approach to the Constitution is not only "admissible" but "abso
lutely indispensable"^®®—indeed, that properly understood it is not
"free." Yet Lessig ultimately concludes that while Lieber is right to
move beyond mere "interpretation" of the Constitution (or, in the
parlance of constitutional theory, beyond "interpretivism"), his
version of construction cannot provide adequate or satisfying con
stitutional readings either. Lessig attributes this failure to the fact
that Lieber does not take account of the institutional constraints
that operate upon the Supreme Court. It is to Lieber's silence as to
institutional concerns that I now turn.
E
Many of the pieces in this symposium highlight, directly and
indirectly, one issue in particular. That issue is Lieber's under
standing, or lack thereof, of institutions and their interactions.
Lieber largely ignores the question of whether some persons
or institutions might be better equipped than others to perform the
different interpretive tasks. This is surprising. While displaying
nothing like postmodern relativism, as Professor Wamke empha
sizes,^®^ Lieber nonetheless took it as a given that different inter
ests and perspective would produce different readings. As Paul
Carrington points out, "a premise" of Hermeneutics is that "what
thoughtful people think and say about law and its interpretation
depends heavily on when and where they are."^®^ For example,
Lieber rejects a plain words approach to texts precisely because the
different interests of different readers will prevent consensus:
"there are two parties in questions of justice, and ... what seems so
uncommonly plain to the one that no possible doubt can exist, ac
cording to his opinion, does by no means present itself in the same
'8
^
100
101
102

See Soifer, supra note 13, at 2309-14.
Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993).
LIEBER, supra note 5, at 50 [at 1926].
See Wamke, supra note 76, at 2191-92.
Carrington, supra note 70, at 2151.
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light to the other."^°^ Similarly, in his discussion of what he terms
"predestined interpretation," he laments that "the interpreter,
either consciously or unknown to himself, yet laboring under a
strong bias of mind, makes the text subservient to his preconceived
views, or some object he desires to arrive at."^"^
Lieber also insists that different kinds of texts require different
interpretive approaches. He devotes chapter VI to those differ
ences. In addition, he stresses the need to consider the particular
context in which the text arose.
At the heart of his hermeneutics
is the insistence that meaning varies with context.^"® All of his
rules for interpretation and construction turn on understanding the
context (linguistic and social) of the text to be interpreted.
Finally, as a political scientist, one who essentially bought into
the framers' model of separated governmental powers, he thought
and wrote about the interactions of different branches of govern
ment, about the nature of democratic governance, about the role of
the judiciary. Mike Horenstein's article touches on some of this
material in Lieber's Political Ethics}°^ Institutional concerns are
even more prominent in On Civil Liberty, which might almost be
said to be about institutions.^"® Indeed, during his life time he was
celebrated as someone especially sensitive to the complexities of
institutional interactions.^""
In short, Lieber is keenly aware of the contingency of mean
ing, the need for interpretation, the influence of setting, perspec103 LIEBER, supra note 5, at 39-40 [at 1919] (emphasis added).
104 Id. at 60 [at 1933],
105 Indeed, perhaps one way of stating the difference between Lieber and, say,
Gadamer, is that while Gadamer insists that understanding is always "understanding as,"
see Warnke, supra note 76, at 2193, Lieber insists that meaning (i.e., authorial intent) is
always "meaning as."
106 See, e.g., LIEBER, supra note 5, at 11-12,107 [at 1900, 1965].
107 See Horenstein, supra note 14, at 2300-02.
108 Freidel's analysis of On Civil Liberty focuses on Lieber's emphasis on the interplay
of governmental and private institutions as the essential check on tyrannical absolutism.
See FREIDEL, supra note 4, at 210-1 A.
lof Consider the following encomium:
Those who wish to see the progress which has been made in political science
since the Greek phase of European history, need but read Aristotle's Politics
and Lieber's Civil Liberty. For with all the ability of Aristotle, and none can
rate it higher than we do, the simple political arrangements of mere city gov
ernments depicted in his work seem trifling enough in comparison with the
complex schemes of security and administration sketched by Lieber as the great
polities of modern times.
Samuel lyier, De Tocqueville and Lieber as Writers of Political Science, PRINCETON REV.,
1858, at 23-24. Tyler particularly emphasizes Lieber's emphasis on the need for institu
tional arrangements, such as "the complex articulated government of the United States,"
id. at 22, to preserve liberty and the rule of law.
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tive, and interest on interpretation, and the complexity of
intragovemmental relations. All of the premises for a discussion of
institutional capacity are present. Yet in Hermeneutics that discus
sion never really occurs. To be sure, Hermeneutics, like his other
work, makes repeated salutes to the independent judiciary."" This
is a particular application of two fundamental precepts: a belief in
the rule of law and an insistence that interpretation be conducted
in good faith. An independent judiciary is the best means for pro
tecting the rule of law and (by) guaranteeing good faith interpreta
tion. But beyond this one, rather obvious, concern, a consideration
of relative institutional capacities is quite far from the heart of
Lieber's work."^
In the present volume. Professors Eskridge and Lessig focus in
particular on this perceived failing. With regard to statutory inter
pretation, Eskridge concludes that Lieber cannot resolve today's
interpretational challenges. For that task, he insists, we must be
more sensitive than was Lieber to strategic behavior, the unavoida
ble influences of perspective, and institutional incentives."^ Les
sig, whose concern is with constitutional interpretation, contends
that Lieber never understands that simply ensuring a formally "in
dependent" judiciary will not free the Supreme Court from a host
of institutional limitations and influences. In particular, the Court
operates within and is constrained by a legal culture that will dis
able it from carrying out the ideal interpretive program."^
These criticisms, if valid, go to the heart of Lieber's project,
for the absence of institutional considerations in Hermeneutics can
not be ascribed to oversight or incompleteness; it grows from the
very nature of his proposals. Lieber is confldent that the influence
of setting, perspective, and interest can be controlled. Indeed,
what defines correct and legitimate inte^retation is the setting
aside of personal leanings, drawing meaning from the text rather
than putting meaning into it.^^"* The premise is that general adop
tion of sound rules of interpretation can avert tyranny and ensure
110 See, e.g., LIEBER, supra note 5, at 36-37,171,178-80,193,227 [at 1917,2012-13,201617, 2025-26, 2047-48].
111 Lieber's emphasis on the independence of the judiciary heips us not at all, for exam
ple, in evaluating the appropriate roles of agency and judiciary under Chevron. See supra
note 92. Chevron (or any theory of deference to agency interpretations) rests on an under
standing of the differences between interpreters, whereas Lieber was aiming for a scheme
in which the identity of the interpreter would not matter.
112 Eskridge, supra note 42, at 2223-24.
113 Lessig, supra note 48, at 2265-67.
114 See, e.g., LIBBER, supra note 5, at 76,118-19,137 [at 1944, 1975,1988].
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the rule of law.^^^ Assuming good faith, it should not matter who is
interpreting: because a text has one true meaning, because the task
of interpretation is to discern it, and because his principles will con
strain and guide the interpreter, just who is interpreting matters
less than that they approach the task correctly. It is perhaps a sign
of the depth of his conviction, or of his optimism, that he seems not
to care about to whom the interpretive task is assigned, as long as
they follow his rules. Of the contributors to the present volume,
Mike Horenstein comes closest to sharing that optimism; Georgia
Wamke is most distant.
Finally, Guyora Binder would redeem Lieber by arguing that
not only does he not ignore institutional considerations, he is in
fact centrally concerned with them. Binder states that Lieber un
derstood that "meaning inheres in language's use by communities
of language users, especially institutions.""® Thus, for Binder,
Lieber's entire account of the process of interpretation rests on the
complex interplay of institutions that our other authors criticize
him for ignoring.
VI
The works in the present symposium exhibit different degrees
of enthusiasm for Lieber on the merits. Whether criticisms or en
dorsements, however, they contribute immensely to our under
standing of Lieber's strengths and weaknesses. Moreover, by using
Lieber as the springboard for reflection,"' they help us think
through the basic quandaries of interpretation, still and always
unsolved.
The many who pause to notice Lieber and comment that he
has been forgotten and neglected"® also tend to comment that he
deserves better."^ With the present symposium, he receives it.

115 Viewed in this light, Lieber's much-criticized insistence on "the one true meaning" is
best explained as Wolfgang Holdheim explains it: as prescriptive rather than descriptive—
an instrumentally essential fiction. See Holdheim, supra note 47, at 2162-63.
11® Binder, supra note 74, at 2185.
Ill A loaded term. See Horenstein, supra note 14, at 2287 (noting Lieber's view that
what separates humans from other animals is not the capacity for thought but the capacity
for reflection).
118 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
119 See, e.g., Aviam Soifer, Reviewing Legal Fictions, 20 GA. L. REV. 871,875 n.lO (1986)
(noting that although Robert Cover "dusted off" Hermeneutics, that "artifact unfortu
nately has been generally forgotten again").

